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Attention and awareness are known to be linked (e.g., see Lavie et al., 2014, for a review).
However the extent to which this link changes over development is not fully understood.
Most research concerning the development of attention has investigated the effects
of attention on distraction, visual search and spatial orienting, typically using reaction
time measures which cannot directly support conclusions about conscious awareness.
Here we used Lavie’s Load Theory of Attention and Cognitive Control to examine the
development of attention effects on awareness. According to Load Theory, awareness
levels are determined by the availability of attentional capacity. We hypothesized that
attentional capacity develops with age, and consequently that awareness rates should
increase with development due to the enhanced capacity. Thus we predicted that greater
rates of inattentional blindness (IB) would be found at a younger age, and that lower levels
of load will be sufficient to exhaust capacity and cause IB in children but not adults. We
tested this hypothesis using an IB paradigm with adults and children aged 7–8, 9–10, 11–12
and 13 years old. Participants performed a line-length judgment task (indicating which arm
of a cross is longer) and on the last trial were asked to report whether they noticed an
unexpected task-irrelevant stimulus (a small square) in the display. Perceptual load was
varied by changing the line-length difference (with a smaller difference in the conditions of
higher load). The results supported our hypothesis: levels of awareness increased with age,
and a moderate increase in the perceptual load of the task led to greater IB for children but
not adults. These results extended across both peripheral and central presentations of the
task stimuli. Overall, these findings establish the development of capacity for awareness
and demonstrate the critical role of the perceptual load in the attended task.
Keywords: perceptual load, inattentional blindness, development, attention, awareness, distractor, conscious
perception
INTRODUCTION
Attention and awareness, though two distinct concepts, are
intrinsically linked. The way in which they interact has been
the subject of fierce debate over the past decades (Lavie et al.,
2014). Anecdotally we know all too well that in some situations
people appear to be completely unaware of anything outside
their focus of attention (try talking to a child engaged in their
favorite pursuit, for example playing their newest video game)
yet in other situations people are constantly distracted and fail to
focus. Even less is known about how the interplay between these
processes is affected by development. The bulk of the previous
research has assessed the development of attention using reaction
time measures to examine age-related changes in susceptibility
to distraction, visual search ability and spatial orienting. This
research clearly demonstrates that control over selective attention
and resistance from distraction develop with age (Plude et al.,
1994). However it does not link attention to awareness as we
briefly review below.
Studies of spatial attention and orienting demonstrate that
while there is some evidence of mature spatial cueing effects from
an early age (e.g., Brodeur and Enns, 1997), the reaction time costs
associated with invalid cues appear to be far greater for children
than adults (e.g., Pearson and Lane, 1990; Brodeur and Boden,
2000). This greater cost is thought to reflect children’s inability
to disengage attention from the invalidly cued location and then
redirect attention to the appropriate location. Moreover, children
also fail to modulate their orienting responses in the face of vary-
ing cue predictability, suggesting that the control processes that
govern orienting develop over childhood (Brodeur and Boden,
2000). However, the reaction time measures used in these studies
do not tell us about the extent to which development of control
over orienting attention leads to improved visual awareness.
Similarly, differences between adults and children are seen in
Garner interference effects. Garner interference refers to the slow-
ing of target responses caused by variation within an irrelevant
dimension. For example, when shown cards that differ in color
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and value, the time taken to sort them on the basis of a relevant
dimension (e.g., color) is greater when the irrelevant dimension
(value) also differs from card to card (and vice versa) (Garner
and Felfoldy, 1970). Such interference effects have been shown
to vary developmentally: effects on response latencies were rela-
tively large for younger children aged 4–5, 6–7 and 10–11 years
(compared with adults), but gradually decreased with increasing
age (e.g., Shepp and Swartz, 1976; Barrett and Shepp, 1988;
Shepp and Barrett, 1991). This finding was particularly apparent
when target and distractor dimensions were conjoined in one
stimulus, and were therefore not easily separable. Together, these
studies imply that the efficiency of gating irrelevant information
is generally poorer at a young age but improves gradually with
maturation. In addition, Stroop studies indicate that younger
children are susceptible to greater interference than older children
and adults, and this effect has been seen in both visual and
auditory modalities (e.g., Hanauer and Brooks, 2003; and see
MacLeod, 1991 for a review; Stroop, 1935; Posnansky and Rayner,
1977). Comalli et al. (1962) demonstrated that interference effects
from incongruent words on color-naming latencies decreased
with age throughout childhood and into adulthood (age range
7–80 years). Response competition studies also demonstrate that
children (aged 4, 5 and 7 years) are less able than adults (aged
20 years) to filter out distractors (Enns and Akhtar, 1989) and
that developmental trends in this ability are seen across child-
hood (5–12 years) (Enns and Girgus, 1985; Ridderinkhof et al.,
1997).
While the evidence described so far demonstrates the develop-
ment of attention control processes, it cannot inform us about
the development of the capacity for visual awareness, because
the aforementioned studies used indirect measures of perception
(e.g., effects on target reaction times (RTs)) rather than direct
measures (e.g., awareness reports). Effects on reaction times can
be attributed to any processing component between the stimulus
and response and clearly do not tell us about the extent of
intrusions of the irrelevant stimuli into awareness. To the best of
our knowledge there is only one study that has assessed relative
awareness rates in children and adults. Memmert (2006) showed
that, when asked to count ball passes between basketball players,
children failed more often than teenagers (aged 13 years) and
adults to notice a person dressed in a gorilla suit walking among
the players (using the inattentional blindness (IB) video clip as
used by Simons and Chabris, 1999). While this study only used
one age group of children (8 years), and therefore developmental
conclusions are limited, the finding that children had lower aware-
ness reports than adults is potentially encouraging regarding the
development of capacity for visual awareness.
Here we used Load Theory of Attention and Cognitive Control
(Lavie et al., 2004) to address the development of the effects
of attention on awareness within a framework that may able to
provide a more comprehensive account for attention develop-
ment than those just focused on attentional control. We suggest
that cognitive maturation involves not only the development of
attentional top-down control mechanisms that are responsible
for preventing irrelevant distraction, but also the development
of attentional capacity. Since according to Load Theory the level
of perceptual processing that leads to awareness is determined by
the availability of attentional capacity (e.g., Lavie et al., 2014), the
developmental increase of this capacity should directly result in
increased awareness rates with age. Note that for ease we shall
use the contracted term “capacity for awareness” to refer to this
linkage in the rest of the article. This has critical predictions
for the development of attention and awareness as we outline
below.
Load Theory states that focused selective attention (on task
relevant rather than irrelevant information) depends not only
on goal-directed cognitive control but also on the perceptual
load (amount of potentially task-relevant information) of a given
task. While full top-down cognitive control ability is necessary
for the active maintenance of the current task priorities (includ-
ing prioritization of relevant over irrelevant stimuli), this alone
is insufficient to achieve exclusive focus on relevant items. In
tasks of low perceptual load, spare capacity left over from the
processing of task-relevant stimuli will “spill over” resulting in
the perception of distractor stimuli. It is only when the per-
ceptual load of the task is high enough to exhaust perceptual
capacity that distractor perception—and their intrusions into
awareness—will be prevented (Cartwright-Finch and Lavie, 2007;
Macdonald and Lavie, 2008, 2011; Lavie et al., 2009; Carmel et al.,
2011).
What are the implications for development? If attentional
capacity for perception and awareness develops with age then we
would expect first, that children will have lower levels of awareness
than adults overall, and second, that a smaller increase in load will
have a greater impact on reducing levels of awareness in children
but not adults. These smaller increases in load would be sufficient
to exhaust capacity in children, but not for adults who possess a
larger capacity. At such levels adults are therefore expected to be
more prone to the processing of irrelevant stimuli, whereas the
children would be better able to focus and harder to detract from
their task. Indeed, the studies showing children are more prone
to distraction (Enns and Girgus, 1985; Enns and Akhtar, 1989;
Ridderinkhof et al., 1997) involved a small number of stimuli in
the display which would be expected to involve only a low level of
load and therefore not to tax capacity.
Encouraging evidence for the suggestion that the capacity
for perception increases with age has been obtained in a few
previous studies. Multiple object tracking significantly increases
from 7–22 years of age (Dye and Bavelier, 2010). Visual search
literature indicates that adults perform visual search significantly
better than children (e.g., Thompson and Massaro, 1989; Kaye
and Ruskin, 1990; Brodeur et al., 1997) and that children show
an increased search rate with age (Donnelly et al., 2007; Woods
et al., 2013) and these age-related differences are particularly
apparent in the more demanding search tasks—for example,
in search for conjunction of features (color and orientation)
rather than a single feature (color, orientation or size alone;
Donnelly et al., 2007). The age-related improvement in visual
search ability has been interpreted by some as evidence that
selective attention and resistance to distraction develop with
maturation. On closer consideration of the nature of visual
search, however, it is clear that the non-target items in a visual
search array are not irrelevant distractors, because they are task
relevant (i.e., they have to be searched among in order to find
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the target, or to conclude that the target is absent from the
array). Hence, these findings may indicate increased capacity for
perceptual discrimination rather than improved ability to reject
distractors. Moreover, as we discussed earlier, the reliance on
RT measures in visual search studies falls short of providing
direct evidence about perceptual processes related to conscious
awareness.
Another line of support for our suggestion that attentional
capacity for perception develops with ages comes from an event
related potentials (ERP) study (Couperus, 2011) on the impact
of perceptual load on neural markers of unattended percep-
tion in groups of children (7–18 years) and adults (mean age
24 years). Participants were asked to identify whether a character
in the center of the screen was a letter or number, and load
was manipulated by changing the stimulus duration (shorter
presentation time representing higher load). Neural activity to
an irrelevant character (a % sign presented offset from the cen-
tral task) was recorded. Results demonstrated that for all age
groups the amplitude of the P100 to unattended stimuli was
lower under high load conditions than under low load conditions.
However, for younger age groups the level of load needed to
elicit these differences was far lower than for older children and
adults.
Thus, overall we propose that development of selective atten-
tion involves both maturation of frontal cognitive control pro-
cesses (as shown by the attention control RT studies) and an
increase in perceptual capacity (as hinted by the motion track-
ing, visual search and recent ERP study). Interestingly, although
maturation of the capacity for frontal cognitive control would
allow older children to have better control over interference by
irrelevant information that had been perceived, the development
of perceptual capacity should lead to more cases of perception of
irrelevant information, for example when the perceptual load of
the task is sufficient to exhaust the smaller capacity of children and
prevent awareness of additional stimuli, but leaves spare capacity
in older children and adults who, consequently, can continue to
process the irrelevant stimulus.
To date, only one study has begun to address this hypothesis.
Huang-Pollock et al. (2002) tested children and adults on a visual
search task with flanking distractors at varying levels of perceptual
load. Their results showed that for all age groups, a distractor
interference effect was seen at the lower levels of perceptual
load and that this was eliminated at the highest level of load.
The decline in interference effect, however, was seen at a lower
level of load for the younger age groups. This is indicative of
reduced capacity in these groups. As with many of the previous
studies, however, the measures used by Huang-Pollock et al. were
indirect (RT effects) and thus cannot support conclusions about
awareness.
In the present study we therefore set out to test the effects
of perceptual load on awareness using an IB paradigm (adapted
from that used by Cartwright-Finch and Lavie, 2007) which
directly assesses conscious awareness reports. Participants were
asked to judge the line lengths of a cross shape with horizontal
and vertical arms and an unexpected, irrelevant stimulus (a
small gray square) was presented in the display on the final trial
of the task. We assessed awareness for this irrelevant stimulus
across a number of age groups at different levels of percep-
tual load. Perceptual load was varied by changing the relative
lengths of the cross arms (more similar length in higher load
conditions). Three levels of load were used: low and high load
length parameters based on previous research (Cartwright-Finch
and Lavie, 2007) and an intermediate load level (with length
parameters in between those used for low and high based on
pilot testing with children). Notice that the irrelevant stimulus
used in this paradigm was not a strong competitor for attentional
selection (e.g., it was not visually salient nor did it compete
with the target response, c.f. Carmel et al., 2012). In this way
our task allows us to clearly address perceptual capacity without
the potential counter-effects of maturation of cognitive control
functions (which are expected to improve distractor rejection).
Importantly, any demands on cognitive control involved in the
line-length discrimination task, did not vary across perceptual
load conditions (since the task remained exactly the same, only
the length of the lines varied). Thus effects of cognitive control
could not confound or counter act the effects of perceptual load
per se. If perceptual capacity does indeed increase with devel-
opment then we expect the level of awareness for the irrelevant
distractor to increase with age, and that a moderate increase in
load will have a greater impact on the awareness rates at younger
ages.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHODS
In Experiment 1, levels of awareness were examined for an
unexpected, peripheral square shape (critical stimulus) across
various age groups under two different levels of perceptual load.
Awareness for this critical stimulus (in this, and all experiments
in this study) was assessed on the final trial as is customary in
the IB paradigm (e.g., Mack and Rock, 1998). Note that the IB
measure is solely based on that single report for each participant
because once participants have been asked about their awareness
one cannot be sure that on subsequent trials the stimulus will
be entirely unattended to, hence the single critical-trial nature of
the task.
Participants
Two-hundred and three participants were recruited from the
Science Museum, London. After exclusions (see Results section),
experimental age groups consisted of the following participants
(N, mean age; SD): 7–8 year-olds (40, 7 years 11 m; 5.5 m), 9–10
year-olds (44, 9 years 11 m; 6.7 m), 11–12 year-olds (40, 12 years
0 m; 7.4 m), 13–14 year-olds (32, 14 years 0 m; 7.0 m), and
adults (32, 30 years; 10 years). All participants reported normal
or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and apparatus
The experiment was presented using E-Prime version 1.1 (Psy-
chology Software Tools Inc.) on a PC connected to a 17′′ monitor
(1024 × 768 screen resolution; 75% contrast). Viewing distance
was fixed at 60 cm with a chinrest. Stimulus displays were bitmap
images created in Microsoft Paint and the background remained
white throughout. Target displays consisted of a black cross at
the center of the screen. One arm of the cross (either vertical
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or horizontal) subtended 3.9◦ whilst the shorter arm subtended
either 0.7◦ (low load condition) or 2.0◦ (intermediate load con-
dition). By using this intermediate level of perceptual load, the
task is sensitive to developmental changes. Previous experiments
(Lavie and Cox, 1997) have found no difference in the extent of
distractor processing between low and intermediate levels of load
(array sizes of 1, 2 and 4) in adults but differences have been
seen in children (raising array size from 2 to 4 items; Huang-
Pollock et al., 2002). On the seventh trial, a black outline square
shape (sides subtending 0.3◦) was presented in addition to the
cross (see Figure 1). This critical stimulus appeared in one of
four peripheral locations (counterbalanced between participants)
all equidistant from fixation at 3.35◦ eccentricity, and positioned
halfway between two neighboring cross-arms. A mesh pattern
consisting of straight black lines of different orientations against
the white background was used as a visual mask.
Procedure
Each trial proceeded as follows: small central fixation dot (1400
ms), blank interval (57 ms), fixation dot (97 ms), second blank
interval (43 ms), centrally-located target cross (110 ms) and visual
mask (496 ms). The repetition of the fixation dot and blank
interval was in order that the fixation dot appeared to flicker,
providing temporal warning for the onset of the task display.
Participants were asked to indicate which arm of the cross was
longer (horizontal or vertical) and responses were entered by the
experimenter. All trials were initiated by the experimenter press-
ing the space bar. Participants were instructed to fixate centrally
throughout and to guess if they were unsure.
Each participant completed 7 experimental trials: 6 non-
critical trials and 1 critical trial. Within both non-critical and
critical trials, the horizontal cross-arm was longer on half the trials
(the vertical longer on the other half) with order counterbalanced
across participants.
On the seventh trial, the critical stimulus was presented and
the cross-task response was made and entered by the experimenter
as normal. Immediately following response entry, participants
FIGURE 1 | Example of stimulus displays and trial sequence (low load)
used in Experiment 1. In the intermediate load condition, the cross arms
were more similar in length (a difference of 1.9◦).
were asked whether they noticed anything else appearing on the
screen that had not been there before. Participants responded
verbally giving details of the object if they could. The critical
trial was then repeated in a final control trial. Before this trial,
participants were instructed to ignore the cross and instead,
look for anything extra that appeared in the display. Awareness
for the critical stimulus was measured immediately after trial-
termination by direct verbal report as before. Only participants
reporting awareness for the critical stimulus on these control trials
were included in the analysis.
RESULTS
Participants who failed the control trial (11), the critical trial
target response (1), or to perform the task at all (1); and par-
ticipants who gave uninterpretable responses (3) were excluded
from the analyses. Remaining participants were divided among
the experimental groups as follows: 7–8 years, low load (20) and
intermediate load (20); 9–10 years, low load (24) and intermediate
load (20); 11–12 years, low load (20) and intermediate load
(20); 13–14 years, low load (16) and intermediate load (16); and
adults, low load (16) and intermediate load (16). All participants
included in the analyses performed the task adequately, with
four or more correct line-length judgments entered. All of the
participants who reported awareness of the critical stimulus (i.e.,
made a “Yes” response to the critical question) were able to
describe correctly its location and at least two of its major features
(shape, size or color). Figure 2 presents the percentage of reported
awareness as a function of age (7–8 years, 9–10 years, 11–12 years,
13–14 years, adults) and perceptual load (low load, intermediate
load). χ2-tests were performed on the data.
Overall rate of awareness
The analysis revealed a significant increase in overall rate of
awareness reports with age, χ2 (4, N = 188) = 41.88, p < 0.001
(see Figure 2).
Post-hoc χ2 comparisons (with Bonferroni-Holm corrected α-
levels for multiple comparisons) revealed similar levels of aware-
ness at the two youngest age groups (7/40 reports in 7–8 year-
olds vs. 10/44 reports in 9–10 year-olds, χ2 (1, N = 84) = 0.36,
p = 0.55). However, children aged 9–10 years gave significantly
lower proportions of aware reports than children aged 11–12
years (20/40 reports, χ2 (1, N = 84) = 6.79, p = 0.009). Children
aged 11–12 years showed the same rates of awareness as children
aged 13–14 years (16/32 reports, χ2 (1, N = 72) = 0, p = 1.00).
However, children of 13–14 years gave significantly fewer reports
of awareness than adults (27/32, χ2 (1, N = 64) = 8.58, p = 0.003).
It seems, therefore, that capacity for awareness develops with age
from 7 years old to adulthood.
This pattern was also seen at each load level: there was a
significant increase in awareness reports with age under low load
(χ2 (4, N = 96) = 26.42, p < 0.001) and intermediate load
(χ2 (4, N = 92) = 22.16, p < 0.001). Under low load, specific
comparisons showed significant increases from 9–10 to 11–12
year-olds (6/24 reports vs. 14/20 reports, χ2 (1, N = 44) = 8.91,
p = 0.003) but no other significant differences between age groups
(p > 0.60). Under intermediate load, a significant increase was
seen between 13–14 year-olds and adults (5/16 reports vs. 12/16
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FIGURE 2 | Percentage of reported awareness of a peripheral critical stimulus (central target) as a function of perceptual load (low vs. intermediate)
and age group, N = 188, in Experiment 1.
reports, χ2 (1, N = 32) = 6.15, p = 0.013) with no other significant
developmental changes (p> 0.10 in all other comparisons).
While this pattern of increase in awareness with age groups
was expected with a moderate increase in level of load, it was
somewhat unexpected that it was also found in the low load
condition. However, note that despite the fairly evident difference
in line length (difference of 3.2◦) the low load task did take up
some capacity. Moreover, recall that for the younger children we
hypothesized that they have a smaller capacity. Therefore at a
younger age, even low capacity consumption is likely to engage a
larger proportion of their smaller total capacity, therefore having
a larger effect on awareness for the unattended stimulus.
Impact of perceptual load
Significantly fewer participants reported awareness for the critical
stimulus when performing a task of intermediate load (28/92)
compared with a task of low load (52/96), χ2 (1, N = 188) = 10.82,
p < 0.01. Importantly, comparing the effects of load for each
age group revealed that increasing the perceptual load from low
to intermediate level reduced awareness in all groups of children
other than 9–10 year-olds: 7–8 years (6/20 vs. 1 /20 in low and
intermediate load groups respectively, χ2 (1, N = 40) = 4.33, p =
0.037); 9–10 years (6 of 24 vs. 4 of 20, χ2 (1, N = 44) = 0.02,
p = 0.69); 11–12 years (14/20 vs. 6 /20, χ2 (1, N = 40) = 6.40,
p = 0.01); 13–14 years (11 of 16 vs. 5 of 16, χ2 (1, N = 32) = 4.5,
p = 0.034). The lack of a significant load effect for participants
aged 9–10 years is likely to be due to the low level of awareness
under low load, producing a floor effect which limited any further
reduction. As predicted, in the adult group, a moderate increase
in the level of load did not affect awareness (15/16 vs. 12/16, χ2
(1, N = 32) = 2.1, p = 0.14) (see Figure 2).
A 2 × 5 multi-way frequency analysis of load (low, interme-
diate) by age (7–8, 9–10, 11–12, 13–14, adult) did not reveal a
significant interaction, χ2 (4, N = 188) = 3.08, p = 0.54. However,
inspection of Figure 2 suggests that this may be due to the
restricted load effect caused by the low baseline level of awareness
in the younger age groups. Indeed, when the two older age groups
of children were combined (11–12 and 13–14) and compared with
adults, the interaction of load (low, intermediate) by age (11–14,
adults) reached significance, χ2 (1, N = 104) = 4.57, p = 0.027.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 demonstrates that awareness for stimuli outside
the focus of attention develops with age, and moreover this is
impacted by a small increase in the level of perceptual load
suggesting decreased capacity for awareness in all children com-
pared to adults. However, as the target was always presented
in the center and the critical stimulus in the periphery, it is
possible that there was a contribution to the overall effect of
age on awareness from development of the ability to disen-
gage from the focus on fixation (e.g., Pearson and Lane, 1990;
Brodeur and Boden, 2000). To investigate this, in Experiment 2
we presented targets in the same range of peripheral positions
as the critical stimulus in Experiment 1, to prevent engagement
of a spatial focus that centered on fixation and excluded the
periphery.
METHODS
Participants
Two-hundred and ten visitors to the Science Museum, London
took part in this experiment. After exclusions (see Results sec-
tion), participants (N, mean age; SD) were divided between the
following age groups: 7–8 year-olds (40, 8 years 0 m; 6.7 m), 9–10
year-olds (44, 9 years 11 m; 7.0 m), 11–12 year-olds (40, 11 years
11 m; 7.1 m), 13–14 year-olds (36, 14 years 0 m; 7.0 m), and
adults (32, 36 years; 11 years). All participants reported normal
or corrected-to-normal vision.
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Apparatus and procedure
Apparatus and procedure were as in Experiment 1.
Stimuli
Figure 3 presents an example of the stimuli used in this exper-
iment. A fixation square subtending 1.4◦ was presented at the
screen’s center. The size of the fixation square was chosen in order
to eliminate the possibility of the initial fixation cue forward-
masking critical stimuli that subsequently appeared at fixation
(e.g., Breitmeyer, 1984). Target displays consisted of a black cross
target with horizontal and vertical axes of the same size as those
used in Experiment 1. Target crosses appeared in either one of
two peripheral locations (upper-left or lower-right visual field,
counterbalanced across trials) with the centers of each cross-target
lying on an imaginary diagonal line, 3.35◦ away from fixation. In
critical trials, a black outline square (each side subtending 0.3◦ as
in Experiment 1) appeared in addition to the cross-target in one of
two peripheral locations, 3.35◦ above or below fixation and 3.35◦
from center of target cross (position counterbalanced between
participants, see Figure 3). All possible stimuli (peripheral cross-
targets and peripheral critical stimuli) lay equidistant from one
another. Thus, when the cross appeared in the lower-right posi-
tion, peripheral critical stimuli were presented only in the lower
visual field and vice versa for upper visual field stimuli. The visual
mask from Experiment 1 was used. A white background was
maintained throughout (see Figure 3).
Target position was counterbalanced across participants with
targets appearing in the upper visual field position on half the
trials and in the lower position on the other half of trials. Target
crosses were presented in the same position on the sixth and
seventh (critical) trials for one group of participants (e.g., upper
position followed by upper position) and in different positions to
another group (e.g., upper position followed by lower position).
RESULTS
Participants who failed the visual control trial (7), the main target
task (2); the critical trial target response (2); participants who gave
FIGURE 3 | Example of stimulus displays and trial sequence
(intermediate load) used in Experiment 2. On the critical trial, the cross
was equally likely to appear in the top left or bottom right of the screen and
the critical stimulus was always presented in the same quadrant as the
cross.
uninterpretable responses (2); participants who were not naive to
the experiment (3); and participants who could not understand
instructions (2) were excluded from the analyses. Remaining
participants were as follows: 7–8 years, low load (20) and interme-
diate load (20); 9–10 years, low load (24) and intermediate load
(20); 11–12 years, low load (20) and intermediate load (20); 13–
14 years, low load (16) and intermediate load (20); and adults, low
load (16) and intermediate load (16).
Overall awareness
Figure 4 presents the percentage of reported awareness for the
critical stimulus as a function of age and perceptual load (low
load vs. intermediate load). All of the participants who reported
awareness of the critical stimulus (i.e., made a “Yes” response to
the critical question) were able to describe correctly its location
and at least two of its major features (shape, size or color).
χ2 analyses revealed that rates of awareness reports signifi-
cantly increased with age across participants aged 7–8 years to
adults, (χ2 (4, N = 192) = 52.13, p < 0.0001). The effect of
age on awareness found in Experiment 1 is therefore replicated
in the current experiment where both the attended cross-targets
and the critical stimulus for which awareness was measured were
presented in the periphery.
Post-hoc comparisons of awareness rates between different
age groups (with Bonferroni-Holm corrected α-levels for mul-
tiple comparisons) revealed no difference in reported awareness
between 7–8 year-olds (10/40) and 9–10 year-olds (13/44), (χ2
(1, N = 84) = 0.22, p = 0.64). However, rates of awareness
reports increased significantly from children aged 9–10 years to
11–12 years (25/40, χ2 (1, N = 84) = 9.19, p = 0.002). Again,
as in Experiment 1, there was no difference between the rates of
awareness reports given by 11–12 year-olds and 13–14 year-olds
(27/36, χ2 (1, N = 76) = 1.37, p = 0.24), and in this experiment
children aged 13–14 years did not report awareness significantly
less often than adults (30/32, χ2 (1, N = 68) = 4.39, p = 0.04).
Therefore, in this experiment, rates of awareness rose with age
between the age brackets of 7–10 years and 11–14 years (see
Figure 4).
As in Experiment 1, significant developmental increases in
awareness reports were evident under both low load (χ2 (4,
N = 96) = 24.60, p < 0.001) and intermediate load (χ2 (4,
N = 96) = 44.42, p < 0.001). Under low load, however, spe-
cific comparisons showed a significant increase only from 9–10
year-olds to 11–12 year-olds (13/24 reports vs. 18/20 reports,
χ2 (1, N = 44) = 6.73, p = 0.009) with no other significant
differences between age groups (p > 0.05). Conversely, under
intermediate load, a significant increase was seen between 9–10
to 11–12 year-olds (0/20 reports vs. 7/20 reports, χ2 (1, N =
40) = 8.49, p = 0.003) and between 13–14 year-olds and adults
(12/20 reports vs. 15/16 reports, χ2 (1, N = 36) = 5.40, p = 0.002).
Thus development of awareness outside the focus of attention
is also evident in tasks that do not require disengagement from
fixation.
Impact of perceptual load
The χ2 analysis also revealed that significantly fewer awareness
reports were given in the intermediate load group (36/96) than
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FIGURE 4 | Percentage of reported awareness of a peripheral critical stimulus (peripheral target) as a function of perceptual load (low vs.
intermediate) and age, N = 192, in Experiment 2.
the low load group (69/96), χ2 (1, N = 192) = 22.89, p < 0.001.
These results replicate the previous findings regarding the effects
of load on awareness in Experiment 1.
Separate χ2 analyses showed that increasing perceptual load
from low level to an intermediate level in the cross task caused
a significant reduction in awareness for the critical stimulus at
every age group of children. Awareness reports decreased from
low load (8/20) to intermediate load (2/20) for 7–8 year-olds, (χ2
(1, N = 40) = 4.8, p = 0.03); 9–10 year-olds, (13/24 vs. 0/20, χ2
(1, N = 44) = 15.38, p < 0.001); 11–12 year-olds (18/20 vs. 7/20,
χ2 (1, N = 40) = 12.91, p < 0.001); and 13–14 year-olds (15/16
vs. 12/20, χ2 (1, N = 36) = 5.4, p = 0.02). By contrast, there was
no difference in the rates of awareness reported by adults under
conditions of low load (15/16) vs. intermediate load (15/16) (see
Figure 4). Thus children of ages up to 16 are more affected by
an intermediate increase in the level of load, when compared to
adults.
A 2× 5 multi-way frequency analysis on the interaction of load
(low, intermediate) by age (7–8, 9–10, 11–12, 13–14, adult) did
not reach significance, χ2 (4, N = 192) = 7.70, p = 0.10. However,
a multi-way frequency analysis of load (low, intermediate) by age
(9–10, 11–12, 13–14, adult) excluding the 7–8 year age group
(which showed smaller effects of load on awareness, likely to
be due to low baseline awareness levels) revealed a significant
interaction, χ2 (3, N = 152) = 8.25, p = 0.04. This interaction
illustrated in Figure 4 suggests that the effect of load on awareness
became smaller as age increased.
The convergence of results across both tasks that involve
and do not involve disengagement from fixation suggests an
overall reduction in awareness outside the focus of attention
that does not depend on the development of the ability to
disengage from fixation. Overall, these findings support our
hypothesis of smaller perceptual capacity in younger children
compared to older children and in all children compared to
adults.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that for adults a moderate
increase in the level of load did not affect the level of awareness for
an unexpected critical stimulus. Based on previous research with
similar tasks (Lavie and Cox, 1997; Cartwright-Finch and Lavie,
2007) we predicted that it would take a higher level of perceptual
load to reduce awareness in a group of adult participants. To test
this, and to confirm that for the tasks and experimental conditions
(e.g., testing in the museum) used in Experiments 1 and 2 load
does indeed modulate awareness in adulthood, we carried out a
further task on an adult group with a higher level of perceptual
load.
METHODS
Participants
Sixty-nine visitors to the Science Museum, London participated
in the experiment. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and were between 18–47 years old.
Apparatus and procedure
Apparatus and procedure were as in Experiment 1.
Stimuli
Stimuli were as in Experiment 2, but with low load (longer arm
of cross subtended 3.9◦; shorter arm subtended 0.7◦) and high
load (longer arm of cross subtended 3.9◦; shorter arm subtended
3.31◦) trials.
RESULTS
All participants performed the task adequately, with four or more
correct line-length judgments entered. Excluded were participants
who failed the final control trial (2), participants who provided
unclear responses (2), and one participant who did not under-
stand the awareness questioning. Remaining participants were
divided equally between the two experimental groups: low load
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(16) and high load (16). All of the participants who reported
awareness of the critical stimulus (i.e., made a “Yes” response to
the critical question) were able to describe correctly its location
and at least two of its major features (shape, size or color). χ2
analyses revealed that rates of awareness reports were significantly
higher in the low load condition (15/16) than in the high load
condition (2/16), (χ2 (2, N = 32) = 21.20, p< 0.01).
Combining these data with those from the intermediate level
of load in Experiment 2, one can see that rates of awareness
under low (15/16) and intermediate (15/16) levels of load are
equivalent and both are significantly greater than awareness in
the high load condition (2/16) (see Figure 5). Experiment 3
confirms that increasing the level of load to a greater extent
results in modulation of awareness for the critical stimuli in adult
participants.
DISCUSSION
Our results reveal that awareness outside the focus of attention
develops with age and that a small increase in the perceptual
load of the attended task reduces awareness rates for children
(aged 7–14 years) but not adults. The effects of age and load on
awareness for a stimulus in the visual periphery converged across
tasks that involved disengagement from fixation (Experiment 1)
and tasks that did not involve this disengagement (Experiment
2). This demonstrates an overall increase in awareness outside the
focus of attention with age. Note that this increase in awareness
with age was found in tasks involving low and moderate levels of
load. The fact that younger children were more prone to IB in
such tasks provides support for our hypothesis that perceptual
capacity is increased in older children compared to younger
children with these levels of load disproportionately taxing the
smaller capacity of the younger ages. This finding—combined
with the fact that, across development, a small increase in the
level of load that had no effect on awareness in adults significantly
reduced the awareness for an unexpected critical stimulus—
demonstrates a smaller perceptual capacity in younger children
FIGURE 5 | Percentage of reported awareness of a peripheral critical
stimulus (peripheral target) as a function of perceptual load (low vs.
intermediate vs. high) in adults (Experiments 2 and 3).
compared to older children and in all children compared to adults.
In adults however, a higher level of perceptual load was required
to modulate awareness (Experiment 3). This finding supports our
proposal that development of attention involves maturation of
awareness for information that is not part of the attended task.
Consequently, the development of perceptual capacity plays an
important part in the development of attention, in addition to
the well-known development of cognitive control. An increase in
capacity would lead to greater availability of resources, resulting
in less of an impact (proportionately) of increases in the level of
load.
It is perhaps important to note that alternative accounts
for the present findings in terms of inability to follow verbal
probing and instruction at younger ages are highly unlikely for
the following reasons. All participating children were school
age, which in the UK means they already have had 3–6 years
of formal education (performance of 7–8 and 9–10 year-olds
did not differ) and therefore much experience following verbal
instructions. Moreover, due to exclusion criteria, all these children
performed correctly on the control trial (and the cross task
generally), indeed only 11 of 203 (Experiment 1) and 7 of 210
children (Experiment 2) were excluded for failing the control
trial (failures that may have resulted from undiagnosed reduced
visual acuity). Furthermore, the experimenter’s notes indicated
that the children of all ages generally expressed a high level of
confidence in their awareness reports: typically either a clear
“yes” and a point to the area in the screen where the critical
stimulus appeared, or a flat “no”. This suggests that they have
clearly understood the question, and perhaps also that responses
tended to be a direct reflection of their perceptual trace rather
than the result of elaborate deliberation. This goes some way
towards alleviating concerns regarding response criteria, although
of course without formally measuring sensitivity verses criterion
(e.g., using signal detection paradigms) alternative accounts for
awareness in terms of effects on response criteria remain viable.
An important extension of this work would be to examine the
effects of load and age on awareness reports using a signal detec-
tion paradigm.
The development of global vs. local processing should also
be considered here. Previous research has highlighted age-related
changes in the bias for processing local over global scene features
(and vice versa). Predominantly, a local processing bias is noted
early in development with a global precedence effect emerging
from age 5 (e.g., Poirel et al., 2008; Vinter et al., 2010), per-
haps a consequence of immature hemispheric communication at
younger ages (Moses et al., 2002; and see Smith and Chatterjee,
2008, for a review). Moreover, some suggest that this global prece-
dence can in fact only be seen much later in development, with
local precedence appearing to dominate perceptual organization
until adolescence, followed by a gradual transition to more a
global processing style (Dukette and Stiles, 1996; Mottron et al.,
1999, 2003; Enns et al., 2000; Porporino et al., 2004; Kimchi
et al., 2005; Scherf et al., 2009). However, evidence for the reverse
pattern has also been found, with demonstrations that 6 and 10
year-olds showed strong global bias, stronger even than that of
adults (Mondloch et al., 2003), and that infants show greater
sensitivity to global than to local structure in visual stimuli
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(Quinn and Eimas, 1986; Ghim and Eimas, 1988; Freeseman et al.,
1993; Quinn et al., 1993; Frick et al., 2000). It has been argued that
this contradiction may be due to differences in task parameters
that differentially affect children’s perceptual biases (Scherf et al.,
2009).
Could these developmental changes in hierarchical processing
account for the better ability to detect the critical stimulus in the
periphery at older ages? For example, could the development of
awareness of the critical stimulus in the periphery be attributed
to the development of a more global processing strategy that
encompasses both the task stimuli at fixation and the periph-
ery? This is somewhat unlikely for the following reasons. The
critical stimulus was in fact smaller in size than the lines used
in the line-length discrimination task. It is therefore unclear
whether development of global precedence with age would lead
to increased awareness of this stimulus. In addition, the con-
vergence of results across Experiment 2 (which, notwithstand-
ing our first point, could be said to encourage a more global
processing strategy because of the reduced spatial certainty and
the presence of all stimuli in the periphery) and Experiment 1
(which could be said to encourage a more spatially-local pro-
cessing strategy) suggest that this factor was unlikely to play a
crucial role. Nevertheless, future research assessing awareness in
tasks that involve both local and global elements of task displays
under various levels of load (e.g., Navon Figures) could prove
interesting in revealing any potential interactions between these
factors.
INCREASED FOCUS IN YOUNGER CHILDREN
It is interesting to consider the flipside of the capacity devel-
opment established in this study. The age-related increases in
awareness outside the focus of attention demonstrate that there
will be more cases where younger children are unaware of stimuli
outside their more narrow focus of attention. In such situations
younger children will appear to have a higher level of focus than
older children, and under moderate increases in the task load
children will be more focused than adults. This fits with anecdotal
observations that children can appear more oblivious to their
surroundings, and be harder to detract from their current object
of focus.
Indeed, our conclusions are consistent with Memmert’s (2006)
findings (discussed earlier) that 8 year-old children exhibited
lower awareness rates than 13 year-olds and adults on the IB
task with the gorilla. However, the dynamic video clip paradigm
that was used in this study allowed participants to freely move
their eyes. Thus any reports of blindness to the “gorilla” while
tracking the ball passes may be due to blurring on the retina
caused by intersaccadic suppression during eye movement rather
than inattention. In keeping with the well-established finding that
orienting of gaze matures with age (Pearson and Lane, 1990), it
is likely that children’s reduced ability to reorient gaze from the
ball to the “gorilla” has contributed to the observed differences
in awareness between the age groups. In contrast, our task used
short exposure durations, which preclude eye movement, and
thus ensure that our findings reflect attentional effects rather than
eye movements.
Our findings can therefore be more clearly attributed to a
narrowing of attention which leads to the exclusion of irrelevant
information under higher levels of perceptual load. Importantly
this effect requires only small increases in perceptual load for
children.
Note that although rates of IB were increased overall for the
younger children (including in the low load condition) this does
not suggest the low level of load was sufficient to exhaust their
smaller capacity since a further reduction in awareness was found
with the moderate increase in load for all ages, including the
youngest. Indeed, an interesting prediction arises whereby finer
grained increases in the levels of perceptual load would be suffi-
cient to exhaust capacity for children of younger, but not older,
ages. This would be an interesting direction for future research.
RECONCILING INCREASED FOCUS AND REDUCED COGNITIVE CONTROL
How do we reconcile the fact that children have, in some situ-
ations, higher levels of focus and yet reduced cognitive control?
The key is firstly to consider the nature of the irrelevant distractor
item. Cognitive control processes are only required to control
against distractors that compete with the target stimulus for
selection—for example, when the distractor is associated with a
different target response or is a very salient stimulus such as a face.
However, non-competing stimuli do not require cognitive control
over selection. Therefore, when cognitive control processes are
loaded (e.g., working memory) there is an increase in the level
of processing of items that compete for the response, but not
of non-competing irrelevant information (Carmel et al., 2012).
This finding, together with our application of load theory to
development suggests that smaller increases in cognitive control
load will lead to increased distraction and greater processing
of irrelevant competing distractors by younger children due to
cognitive control immaturity.
In our study, however, the irrelevant distractor is non-
competing as it is a small square presented while participants are
performing a line discrimination task. The processing of non-
competing distractors does not depend on cognitive control but
depends instead on perceptual processes. With this in mind, a
different developmental pattern of results is expected for the
processing of these stimuli. Under low load (i.e., when percep-
tual capacity limits are not reached), we would not expect to
see increased processing of irrelevant non-competing items with
maturation. Indeed, we would expect this equivalent performance
across age groups to remain even if cognitive control processes
were loaded. Comparing our findings under low load with those
of Huang-Pollock et al. (2002) demonstrates this dichotomy.
In their study, the distractor competed for a response (letter
distractor and letter search attended task) and, as predicted, under
low load the children showed increased distractor processing. This
interference was then eliminated by a smaller increase in percep-
tual load (than for adults). In our study, however, the irrelevant
item was non-competing and we show the opposite pattern—
distractor processing was lower in the children than the adults
under both low and intermediate levels of perceptual load. While
this was expected under intermediate levels of load (where the task
loaded the children’s smaller capacity, but not that of the adults)
it was not predicted that age-related changes would be evident
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under low load. As mentioned above, the lack of equivalent
performance in this condition is likely due to age-related changes
in the ability to disengage from the cross stimulus and shift the
focus of attention. Future research involving the manipulation
of cognitive control vs. perceptual load, and competing vs. non-
competing distractors, would undoubtedly be fruitful.
IMPLICATIONS
The results we present here have implications for attentional
performance in a number of situations. Given that a moderate rise
in perceptual load leads to a greater increase in focused attention
for younger children (compared to older children and adults), it is
likely that performance on paradigms such as Garner and Stroop
tasks could be improved in younger age groups by the addition of
perceptual load—provided that these are performed with some
separation between the relevant and irrelevant dimensions so
that attention can be clearly engaged in the relevant task rather
than the irrelevant processing with increased perceptual load.
Aside from these experimental situations, our findings also have
practical consequences whereby the modulation of perceptual
load could be used to improve the focus of attention in young
children, and hence the efficacy of learning tools.
The present findings that children have lower rates of aware-
ness than adults and that a moderate increase in perceptual load
that had no effect on awareness in adults, was sufficient to increase
IB rates in children also have interesting neural implications. They
imply that unattended stimuli in IB tasks should evoke less activity
in children than adults due to their smaller perceptual capacity.
Furthermore, these neural modulations would be found at lower
levels of load in children, compared to the level needed to reduce
neural response to unattended stimuli in adults.
Overall, our findings demonstrate that maturation involves
the development of awareness outside the focus of attention and
an increase in perceptual capacity. This leads to a greater likeli-
hood of IB, namely enhanced focus and resistance to irrelevant
intrusions into awareness in the younger children. This must
be considered together with evidence of age-related changes in
cognitive control processes to understand fully the development
of selective attention. Looking at the development of the latter in
isolation does not accurately reflect the full picture.
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